Social action as ‘a total social phenomenon’: Comparing leadership challenges facing community-based labour organisations in China and Japan by Fu, Huiyan
  1 
Social action as ‘a total social phenomenon’: Comparing leadership challenges facing 
community-based labour organisations in China and Japan 
 
Abstract  
This paper seeks to address an empirical puzzle: “why do community-based labour 
organisations (CLOs) in China and Japan play a similarly marginal role in facilitating social 
change, despite drastic differences in national circumstances?” Theoretically, special 
importance is given to a cross-disciplinary approach that combines anthropology and business 
and management perspectives. Methodologically, the comparative study draws on ethnographic 
fieldwork and interviews to explore how leadership activism is embedded in and shaped by an 
intricately interwoven web of political, economic and cultural forces, what anthropologists refer 
to as ‘a total social phenomenon’. The findings highlight a series of agential and structural 
challenges, especially those arising from the tension between culture and social institutions. 
More generally, the work contributes to an alternative, critical understanding of leadership. 
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Introduction 
Under the ‘creative destruction’ of neoliberalism where the influence of traditional labour 
unions has been waning (Harvey 2005), the primary means of collective action has been 
increasingly articulated through a proliferation of non-governmental and grassroots 
organisations across many parts of the world. Of particular importance here is community-
based labour organisations (CLOs) whose potential as new actors to lay the foundations of a 
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different future for employment relations has sparked meaningful debate (Cooke and Wood 
2014). Emerging at the periphery of traditional labour politics, CLOs have played an 
increasingly crucial role in filling a representation gap left by mainstream unions’ inability or 
unwillingness to organise disadvantaged workers. To a certain extent, they constitute a 
Polanyian countermovement essential to face an unequal world where capitalist domination is 
overweening and alternative futures are in short supply (Burawoy 2015). In China and Japan, 
CLOs are vigorous champions of labour rights, amid an accelerating trend towards precarious 
employment that has resulted in growing social inequalities. Their organising leaders seek to 
promote social justice for non-regular and vulnerable workers who are excluded from, or 
differentially included in, social protection.  
Despite the significance of CLOs, empirical comparative research, especially in non-western 
contexts, is scarce1. Drawing on ethnographic participant observation and interviews, this paper 
sets out to compare CLOs in China and Japan through the prism of leadership. In both countries, 
CLOs are typically small-scale organisations run by a couple of leading activists. Their 
engagement with workers, network and coalition building, the state and mainstream unions is 
crucial to the effectiveness of activism for progressive social change — existing studies tend to 
focus predominantly on mainstream unions’ involvement in community or civil society 
organising (Fine 2007; McBride and Greenwood 2009; Heery et al. 2012; Tapia 2013; Holgate 
2015; Tattersall 2018). In closely examining these interrelated engagement areas, the 
comparative study aims to highlight the complex ways in which leaders’ perceptions and 
practices in everyday life are influenced not only by key political-economic institutions but also 
by dominant cultural values that infuse almost every aspect of social life. In anthropological 
terms, leadership activism is ‘a total social phenomenon’, which requires a holistic, context-
sensitive empirical investigation. Such an approach will offer a fresh critique of ‘leadership 
romanticism’ (Collinson et al. 2018) — i.e. decontextualised and idealised leadership — which 
  3 
derives its provenance from western traditions and continues to permeate much of the 
contemporary leadership and management literature. By bridging different disciplinary 
perspectives and engaging in a systematic cross-national comparison, this paper hopefully 
contributes to generalisable insights and lessons that will inform a more critical, deromanticised 
understanding of leadership beyond its original organisational and national focus.  
In achieving the above goals, the paper shies away from being driven by a pre-defined, 
narrow set of concepts or hypotheses that might lead to the imposition of inappropriate, often 
Anglo-Saxon modes of thought (Buckley and Chapman 1997). Instead, the research process is 
centred upon an empirically observed puzzle: “why do CLOs in China and Japan play a 
similarly marginal role in facilitating social change, despite drastic differences in national 
circumstances?” To address the puzzle, the rest of the paper first lays out theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings before moving to a fieldwork-based comparative analysis of 
leadership activism in CLOs.  
 
Total social phenomenon and its relevance to critical leadership studies 
Total social phenomenon is a key notion in anthropological theory. The notion is virtually 
synonymous with the name Marcel Mauss and his classic treatise on The Gift (1954). For 
Mauss, a gift is given within a particular complex set of social relations and institutions, which 
at the same time encompasses those relations and institutions. In other words, gift exchange 
comprises a total social phenomenon, which is at once economic, legal, political, religious, 
moral, social and personal. This conceptualisation is also known as ‘holism’, which, along with 
its methodological companion ethnography, defines a distinctive style of inquiry inherent in 
anthropology since its birth as a modern discipline (Otto and Bubandt 2011). Remaining at the 
core of anthropological theory and practice — albeit uneasily due to functionalist and 
structuralist fallacies in the past2 — holism brings to the fore the centrality of contexts in 
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comprehending human life.  Contexts, or lifeworlds, are conceived as a relatively ‘seamless’, 
interconnected whole that emphasises the complex and dynamic interrelationships of all aspects 
of human existence (Ortner 1984: 148).  
Applying the anthropological holism to leadership activism in China and Japan’s CLOs, 
Figure 1 shows how the role of leaders in driving social change hinges not only on key political 
and economic institutions but also on culture. The relationship between culture and social 
institutions, which assumes special significance in anthropological theory and practice, merits 
further consideration. Until the early 1970s, anthropology was divided between the British 
school of ‘social’ anthropology and the American school of ‘cultural’ anthropology. Durkheim-
influenced British anthropologists approached culture from a social institutional angle whereas 
American anthropologists concentrated on individual autonomous interpretations of culture as 
a web of meanings3. The subsequent rise of ‘discourse analysis’ or ‘symbolic anthropology’ 
(Parkin 1984; Bourdieu 1991), which accentuates the role of language use in social construction 
of reality, has brought together the two foci as a collective concern and placed a renewed 
emphasis on the dialectical relationship between individual interpretive freedom and structural-
institutional constraints. Among anthropologists, culture is now widely recognised as an ever-
continuing discursive process in which a society’s core values, beliefs and norms are 
constructed, maintained, mediated, challenged or changed, a process intricately intertwined 
with political and economic forces.  
Such a holistic, processual view throws light on the role of culture and agency in social 
dynamics, which has important implications for understanding leadership challenges facing 
CLOs in China and Japan. This is especially because, as demonstrated most potently in 
anthropological accounts, the kinds of wholes where non-western people live their lives stand 
in stark contrast to life in the west. China and Japan, despite significant differences in their 
contemporary political-economic systems, are culturally proximate, sharing a common cultural 
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Figure 1. Social action as a total social phenomenon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tradition of (broadly defined) Confucianism. Confucian values — including, for example, 
hierarchy, family-oriented ethos, harmony and collectivism — foreground an interconnected 
relationship between individual and society, with precedence given to the fulfilling of socio-
cultural norms and expectations. These and other historically inherited values invariably bear 
on modern social institutions in China and Japan. Hence, examining the engagement of leaders 
with key institutions such as industrial relations and laws entails a cultural dimension, which 
existing research tends to overlook or understudy. 
The paper’s culture-centred holistic approach can make a distinct contribution on two fronts. 
First, the ‘non-western’ holism in China and Japan is immensely valuable in contesting the 
situatedness of modern western thought. In particular, it lends itself well to the interrogation of 
cultural assumptions of individualism, which idealise individuals as solid selves devoid of 
social ties (Dumont 1985, 1986; Lukes 1973). To be sure, the separation of individuals from 
society is a powerful modern ideology responsible for ‘a theoretically unbridgeable chasm 
between is and ought to be’ (Dumont 1986: 244). Within the field of business and management, 
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which is ‘a largely North American creation’ (Chapman 1997: 9), individualism and its 
variations have continued to exert a strong influence, not least on leadership research. In their 
recent piquant critique of leadership romanticism, Collinson et al. (2018) unpack  an interrelated 
set of assumptions by delving into their deeper aesthetic and philosophical roots in western 
history. These assumptions fixate on leaders’ ‘natural’, ‘transcendental’ and ‘positive’ 
attributes, embrace ‘expressive collectivism’ (or the collective endorsement of individual 
expression), and eschew ‘points of rupture’ (or conflict and contradiction). From an 
anthropological point of view, the thesis of leadership romanticism not only disembeds 
leadership from its complex contexts or lifeworlds in which it acquires specific meanings and 
experiences, but also confuses powerful, grandiose discourses — i.e. what leaders ought to be, 
see, e.g., Alvesson and Kärreman (2011) — with real-life situations. To put it another way, 
leadership is neither contextualised as a total social phenomenon; nor is it grounded in empirical 
reality. 
Secondly, and relatedly, investigating culture and its entanglements with social institutions 
affords fresh insights into the role of leaders as social change agents. This is closely related to 
the aforementioned anthropological conceptualisation of culture as discourse or a symbolic and 
inherently contestable construct, which opens up new avenues for critique (Linstead 1997). As 
Figure 1 illustrates, leadership activism pertaining to CLOs in China and Japan is influenced 
by an interconnected set of culture and political-economic forces. It should be stressed that core 
cultural values are often instrumentally used, or implicated, in the legitimisation of social 
institutions. Herein lies the political engagement of leading actors in ‘society-as-discourse’ 
(Parkin 1984), i.e. how to bring about social change through discursive reconstruction of 
culture. In real-life settings, such agential freedom and capacity is, however, often fraught with 
restrictions, contradictions and complications. While possessing the potential to effect change, 
leaders are being affected by the culture they inhabit. Agency, therefore, does not emerge from 
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a void; to use Karl Marx’s famous saying, ‘men make their own history, but not under the 
circumstances of their own choosing’. The ‘messy’ theoretical picture depicted here raises 
important methodological issues, as well as underlining the complex and often contradictory 
nature of challenges confronting leading actors. 
 
Methodology 
This study is an extension of the author’s many years of research on non-regular workers and 
social inequalities against the backdrop of an accelerating global trend towards labour market 
flexibilisation (Fu 2011, 2015, 2016). For many non-regular workers in Japan and China, CLOs 
appear to be one of the very few institutional devices whereby they could have their voice heard 
and seek help. A further pertinent fact is that there are considerable similarities between the two 
countries’ CLOs. As shown in Table 1, while taking different forms, CLOs are a loose array of 
small-scale, locally based organisations, typically run by a couple of leaders. Although 
struggling with limited financial and human resources, they manage to provide workers with 
legal and cultural services. The main difference, however, lies in the leadership profile; leaders 
in China tend to be more varied individuals, including urban intellectuals, young university 
graduates and migrant workers, whereas those in Japan are characterised by a preponderance 
of experienced older-generation male activists.  
In Japan, community unions, or ‘individually-affiliated unions’ (kojin kamei kumiai), play 
an important role in championing labour rights, especially those of non-regular, female, young 
and foreign workers in small and medium-sized enterprises. Established in the early 1980s, they 
flourished under the auspices of Sohyo, a left-wing confederation of public-sector unions. In 
1989, Sohyo merged into Rengo, the most powerful national union confederation comprised 
mainly of large enterprise unions. Consequently, many community unions collapsed; others 
transitioned into self-sustaining organisations while new ones emerged. It is worth noting that  
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Table 1. CLOs in China and Japan 
 
 Labour NGOs in China Community Unions in Japan 
Number 50-70 774  
Size Small, typically run by a couple of leaders 
Scale Small, locally based 
Finance 
Donations from Hong Kong or overseas; 
increasingly difficult 
Membership dues;  
small membership and high drop-out rates 
Service Legal and cultural services 
Leadership 
Profile 
Urban intellectuals, migrant workers, 
young university graduates 
Experienced older-generation male 
activists 
 
 
community unions enjoy considerable political independence and legal freedom, especially 
regarding the ease with which a union can be quickly formed and engage in collective 
bargaining; in fact, the union recognition procedures are more liberal than those in the US and 
the UK (Suzuki 2008, 2012). 
 In China, since independent unions relying on membership-based funding are strictly 
proscribed, labour NGOs emerge as the main form of CLOs, representing a grassroots effort to 
organise and empower long-exploited rural migrant workers. Created in the mid-1990s, they 
sprang up in economically well-developed cities and regions where a huge number of rural 
migrant workers were concentrated. The development was closely related to deplorable 
sweatshop conditions and pervasive disaffection with mainstream unions and local 
governments. In marked contrast to Japan’s community unions, labour NGOs are plagued by a 
tenuous lawful status; they are tightly controlled by the Party-state via a cycle of surveillance, 
repression and co-option, the corollary of which has been a constant struggle between 
organisational survival and labour activism (Chan 2013; Xu 2013; Howell 2015).  
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Despite the drastically different political and legal environment, neither form of CLOs has 
been able to exert strong socio-cultural power that could rival state and capital power and drive 
meaningful change. Both China and Japan are described as presenting inhospitable terrain for 
labour movements (Friedman and Lee 2010; Weathers 2010). As mentioned at the beginning 
of the paper, central to the research process is the question: “why do CLOs in China and Japan 
play a similarly marginal role in facilitating social change?” 
To address the question, a qualitative research design was used, with an emphasis on leaders’ 
perceptions and practices in everyday life. Six-month intensive fieldwork was undertaken 
during March-August 2016, which was supplemented by a follow-up study during June-
September 2017. The author is a Chinese national, speaks fluent Japanese and has had extensive 
experience in conducting ethnographic research, which enabled relatively effective first-hand 
data collection within a tight time frame. Beijing and Shenzhen in China and Tokyo in Japan 
were chosen as the primary field sites, as they were among CLOs’ most concentrated and active 
areas (Figure 2, Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 2. Community unions’ concentrated areas in Japan 
 
 
 
 
  10 
 
Figure 3. Labour NGOs’ concentrated areas in China 
 
 
 
 
In Japan, significant amounts of data were gleaned via participant observation sessions 
inside two community unions based in Tokyo. The author attended a number of training 
workshops, campaign rallies, street marches and various social gatherings, and on these 
occasions had numerous informal conversations with leaders, ordinary workers, civil society 
leaders, labour lawyers, union officials and party politicians. In addition to this ethnographic 
component, more than 20 unstructured interviews were conducted with community unions’ 
leaders within Tokyo’s metropolitan area. In China, due to heightened political sensitivity and 
limited financial resources available for this research, primary data was collected through a 
series of unstructured and semi-structured interviews with a total number of 11 labour NGOs’ 
leaders based in Beijing and Shenzhen; where possible, efforts were made to interview the same 
individual multiple times during the two phases of fieldwork. The lack of immersing 
participatory investigation is mitigated by the fact that there is a burgeoning body of literature 
on labour NGOs, which is a well-trodden area of research within Chinese studies. The paper 
also draws on a wide range of secondary fieldwork sources, including organisational pamphlets, 
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campaign documents, newspaper articles and social media platforms. To protect individual and 
organisational privacy and confidentiality, pseudonyms are adopted to disguise real identities. 
The following empirical data analysis features a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) and a 
systematic comparison of leaders’ engagement with workers, network and coalition building, 
the state and mainstream unions, with a view to showing social action as a total social 
phenomenon. In comparing leadership challenges in each engagement area, special emphasis 
is placed upon how leaders’ strategies and actions are embedded in and shaped by an 
interconnected set of political, economic and cultural forces.  
 
Comparing leadership challenges facing CLOs in China and Japan 
 
Workers  
Both forms of CLOs focused their efforts on worker engagement via legal and cultural services. 
In China, labour NGOs gravitated towards less ambitious legal aspects of working life due 
primarily to stringent political control. They were committed to promulgating labour rights 
knowledge through consultation, training classes, leaflets, exhibitions and social media. In 
addition, they offered advice and assistance that helped aggrieved workers to seek justice via 
state-approved bureaucratic and judicial channels —  which were designed for solving 
individualised, rather than collective, disputes. The importance of law was emphasised 
frequently by leaders, as Ms Yang commented: 
 
Many rural migrant workers were not familiar with legal knowledge. Even they know something 
is not right, they don’t know how to resolve it legally. They tend to resort to uncontrolled 
emotions, irrational thinking and sometimes violent acts. … Of course, law is the most powerful 
weapon that workers could use to ‘safeguard their legal rights’ (weiquan). 
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Labour NGOs also ran a rich array of educational and leisure activities, which enabled workers 
to acquire new skills, unwind, feel involved and engage in artistic endeavours (such as musical 
composition and poetry writing). For rural migrants, those ‘cultural services’ (wenhua 
huodong) were highly beneficial; they provided not only informal learning opportunities, but 
also an antidote to alienations experienced in a hostile urban environment and a sense of 
camaraderie and belonging — which, as argued by Xu (2013), would contribute to the long-
term nurturing of working-class consciousness.  
Nonetheless, leaders’ relationships with workers were far from smooth in everyday 
interactions. For one thing, Chinese workers were wary of ‘free help’, especially from ‘non-
official’ organisations, which they thought might turn out to be a commercial scam. For another, 
labour NGOs’ lack of institutional legitimacy made it difficult for leaders to get their intentions 
across and to establish credibility, as Mr Zhao explained:  
 
I was once criticised by rural migrant workers about my salary; they questioned, “how come you 
earn more than us?” … They assume those working for labour NGOs shouldn’t be paid for their 
work. In China, this line of work has a very low social standing. The nature of civil society is 
not well understood. 
 
The situation was further compounded by the emergence of professional fee-charging ‘citizen 
representatives’ (gongmin daili), with whom labour NGOs had to compete. A more 
fundamental problem, however, lay in the fact that rural migrants, labelled as ‘floating 
populations’ (liudong renkou), frequently moved back and forth between city and country 
because of hukou (household registration), China’s long-existing institutional discrimination 
against rural citizens. Despite that hukou encouraged second-class treatment for rural migrant 
workers and created a major obstacle to developing sustainable collective capacity, few labour 
NGOs made explicit the link between hukou’s structural exclusion and labour rights violations 
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—  the latter figured most importantly in their public discourses. Moreover, hukou and its status 
hierarchies adversely affected the relationship between leaders and rural migrants. In certain 
labour NGOs, young university graduates and urban intellectuals relied heavily on their legal 
knowledge and expertise to construct credible impression, enhance superior status and impose 
power. Some leaders’ attitudes contained an undertone of sympathy, rather than striving to 
empathise with rural migrants’ realities. Others felt deeply frustrated by rural migrants’ rustic 
ignorance; for instance, a well-educated young leader who left for a new career in a company 
considered his volunteering experience at a labour NGO as ‘a botched social experiment’. 
Clearly, intellectual ability or youthful exuberance alone was not enough for engaging 
effectively with workers from drastically different social backgrounds.   
In Japan, community unions were famous for developing aggressive and innovative 
bargaining tactics, in sharp contrast to mainstream enterprise unions that rarely organised 
confrontational demonstrations or strikes. Their services were centred on labour counselling 
and collective bargaining. It should be noted here that the Japanese law requires only two 
workers (e.g. one union leader and one aggrieved worker) to form a union and compels the 
employer to bargain over even one worker’s grievances. If the employer refuses to bargain, 
community unions could help workers seek local governments’ arbitration and court litigation. 
While counselling services were dispensed free of charge, directly negotiating with the 
employer would oblige the worker to become a dues-paying member. Like China’s labour 
NGOs, community unions were also interested in organising educational and leisure activities 
such as workshops and tea parties that would provide workers with opportunities to learn new 
knowledge, acquire professional skills, share their grievances and nurture a feeling of ‘one-is-
not-alone’ (hitori dewa nai) — a phrase frequently evoked in leaders’ everyday discourses. 
However, worker attendance was typically low; the author attended a series of workshops, 
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campaign rallies and social gatherings during which only a handful of rank-and-file members 
showed up.  
The Japanese public was largely apathetic, if not negative, about community unions. Labour 
protests tended to be seen as the disruption of social order and thus frowned upon, as Mr 
Nakamura recounted:  
 
Some journalist wrote an article in a local newspaper, criticising how our marches blocked the 
traffic, created annoying noises and caused trouble to residents and commuters. … He didn’t 
even bother to write why we took to the streets and what we were protesting about!   
 
While community unions were occasionally applauded by the media for protecting helpless and 
powerless workers, they were sometimes referred to as ‘Refuge Temples’ (kakekomidera), 
which in the past offered emergency help to Japanese women fleeing from their abusive 
husbands. This somewhat derogatory expression had connotations of temporariness and 
triviality, which were reinforced by community unions’ strong focus on solving isolated 
individual disputes, i.e. ‘individualised’ bargaining. Many leaders spoke about how difficult it 
was to mobilise workers at a collective level, as illustrated by Mr Suzuki: 
  
Of course, we support union building in the workplace. However, organising workers across 
different companies is very difficult because of the influence of enterprise unionism. … Even 
within the same company, it is difficult to create a strong alliance between non-regular and 
regular workers, who themselves tend to shun each other. … In the Japanese company culture, 
workers are expected to be loyal and solve their problems within the company. Seeking help 
from outsiders like us is not something they can easily do without some trepidation. 
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In addition, there was a high membership drop-out rate; many workers cancelled their 
membership soon after their problems were solved. Some leaders ascribed members’ low 
involvement to the lack of financial and human resources available for mobilising efforts; others 
surmised that Japanese workers were too preoccupied with their own lives or simply apathetic 
about labour activism. There was, however, relatively muted discussion about community 
unions’ male-dominated organisational culture. The majority of the leaders were older-
generation males who grew up in the 1950s and 1960s, a period marked by relatively strong 
labour and student movements in Japan. Everyday leadership practices were highly gendered; 
a high-profile leader, who enjoyed extensive media visibility, grudgingly admitted that the 
absence of women in senior leadership positions and labour activism in general was a real 
problem and said half in jest, “yes, we promote gender equality, which does not mean we 
actually practice it!”. There were also complaints about older-generation leaders’ lack of 
interest in adopting new technologies and supporting young leaders. For example, community 
unions’ websites and campaign logos were often derided by young people as dasai (‘out-dated’ 
or ‘uncool’). Such distinctive macho, seniority-based leadership practices arguably encumbered 
community unions’ ability to attract a broad cross-section of workers, especially women and 
youth who made up the bulk of disempowered and disengaged workers in Japan. Ms Sato, one 
of the very few female leaders, expressed deep concern about the future of community unions: 
 
For women, especially young women, the environment is toxic. … Older males are behaving 
like a ‘King of the Mountain’ (oyama no taisho) who are content with creating an obligation of 
gratitude from pitiful workers in their own small territory.  . … They also monopolise knowledge 
and skills and are not really interested in training young people. Lack of future successors is a 
critical issue facing community unions. The whole situation amounts to self-obsessed navel-
gazing to me! 
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Network and coalition building 
Among China’s labour NGOs, internal network building or cross-organisational collaboration 
was few and far between. This was predominantly because such an alliance was an anathema 
to the authorities and could lead to accusations of orchestrating politically-threatening ‘mass 
incidents’ (qunti shijian). As a result, conscious efforts were made by leaders to circumvent 
any joining-hands actions, especially regarding the organisation of workers across multiple 
workplaces. Nonetheless, there were occasional collective celebrations during the festive 
season (such as the Chinese New Year) across different labour NGOs located in close 
proximity. Such cultural services were less likely to attract negative attention from the 
authorities. A few labour NGOs, aided by Hong Kong-based labour activists, ventured to 
connect their labour rights campaigns with transnational civil society and advocacy networks. 
However, foreign partnership and funding was a highly sensitive political issue due to the 
perceived external ‘hostile forces’ that would pose a risk to national security and stability. In 
April 2016, the state passed a new stringent law on the management of foreign NGOs in China, 
with the aim of tightening control over funds domestic labour NGOs could receive.  
The resulting intense competition for scarce funding contributed to strained inter-
organisational relationships. There existed a prevalent attitude of mutual distrust among leaders 
who tended to see each other as competitors. Moreover, in the absence of independent financial 
monitoring, labour NGOs were involved in reported pecuniary scandals, which led many to 
cast doubt on the integrity and competence of leaders as a whole, as Mr Zhao put it:  
  
We are ‘a motley crew’ (ren tan za). Some are clearly using labour NGOs to ‘go after fame and 
wealth’ (zhui mingli). They don't have a genuine interest in safeguarding labour rights. … Surely, 
there are some leaders who misuse and embezzle funding; for them, personal gains are more 
important than anything else.  
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In Japan, Community Union National Network (CUNN), a loosely connected nationwide 
network, was founded in 1990. It organises a national conference every year and is 
characterised by a decentralised power structure where each community union maintains its 
own decision-making freedom. During joint campaigns, CUNN’s central administration in 
Tokyo made overtures to member unions, but often failed to ensure maximum involvement due 
to lack of authority. For instance, only around one third agreed to join a recent campaign to 
raise the minimum wage; many spurned the invitation because the campaign was led by a 
community union whose political party association was not to their liking. Mr Tanaka, a leader 
from one of the most long-existing and well-known community unions, commented: 
 
It might be difficult for outsiders to understand, but the Japanese won’t simply put the past 
behind and move on. … Different political and personal views bitterly divided the labour 
movement in the past, which continues to have repercussions on the relationship between 
community unions.   
 
There were cross-organisational collaborations, which were based mainly on personal 
relationships. The same could be said about community union’s partnerships with local civil 
society groups. Typically, those collaborations and partnerships were locally based, small-scale 
networks centred upon a couple of veteran leaders. Community unions were a very small world 
where leaders knew each other well. Among old friends, efforts were made to develop a strong 
spirit of camaraderie. At the same time, however, there existed protracted, interpersonal 
disputes, which were the main causes of recurrent inter-organisational fighting and intra-
organisational splitting.  
 
The state and mainstream unions 
  18 
Labour NGOs in China are carefully controlled by the state. Scholars often invoke ‘state 
corporatism’ to underline top-down monopolisation (Chan and Chiu 2015) or portray the state’s 
shifting strategy as periods of harassment, muted tolerance, repression and co-option (Howell 
2015). Until recently, the Chinese government imposed onerous legal registration requirements 
for an official status. Consequently, some labour NGOs were registered as a business entity; 
others chose to be affiliated with existing lawful organisations; and yet others simply operated 
without a licence and kept a low profile. Since the early 2010s, the registration regulation had 
been relaxed and a selected number of ‘non-threatening’ labour NGOs had been incorporated 
into the state’s welfare-focused service cooperation as subcontractors with access to public 
funding (Howell 2015). Along with the co-option, labour NGOs as a whole continued to be 
subject to intermittent harassment, licence revocations and forced shutdowns if their activities 
were deemed to be overstepping political boundaries — as evidenced, for example, by a 
massive wave of crackdown in Guangzhou in December 2015 that saw organising leaders 
detained and sentenced for ‘disruption of social order’.  
Despite the adverse political environment, some labour NGOs, especially those based in 
Guangdong province’s Pearl River Delta, sought to influence state policy by means of research 
publication and international pressure. Many leaders showed remarkable resilience and were 
engaged in various modes of everyday negotiations with authorities. Some relied on informal 
guanxi or personalised networks — a much-valued cultural norm — to elicit sympathy and 
support from local officials, while others were keen on developing proactive strategies to deal 
with government harassment. As Ms Wang said: 
 
Not all local officials are hostile towards us; some are sympathetic towards our cause, albeit not 
openly. … It is very important to build individual guanxi and deepen personal relationships, 
which will always make things easier. Especially when ‘the situation is tense’ (feng sheng jin), 
you will have first-hand information and get prepared: forewarned is forearmed. 
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Figure 4. Labour Disputes in China (1994-2014)5 
Accepted Cases by Labour Dispute Arbitration Committees 
(Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, various years, National Bureau of Statistics of the 
People’s Republic China) 
 
 
 
 
Such informal negotiations, as pointed out by Franceschini (2014), often resulted in a tacit 
agreement in which  labour NGOs were allowed to keep their tenuous lawful status by operating 
in accordance with the state’s social stability and ‘rule-by-law’ regime. 
Occasionally, labour NGOs developed collaborative relationships with the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the only legitimate representative of organised labour 
in China that remains firmly a part of the Party-led state. Over the past two decades, the state 
had taken a gradualist and decentralised approach to the reform of employment relations 
(Friedman and Kuruvilla 2015). Amid rising labour unrest (Figure 4), local governments and 
ACFTU branches were more open to cooperation from labour NGOs. For instance, some 
Guangdong-based labour NGOs were invited to participate in official discussions during the 
drafting process of new pro-labour laws. There were also examples where labour NGOs under 
the auspices of the local ACFTU carried out so-called ‘enterprise intervention’ (Chan 2013), 
which included social auditing, in-factory training and support for the establishment of unions 
or employee representation committees. These and other pro-labour experiments, however, had 
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largely fallen within the state-sanctioned ‘rule-by-law’ system; they rarely extended beyond a 
single workplace or a small local area. Many were short-lived due to management manipulation, 
local governments’ pro-capital stance and the absence of independent labour unions. Thus, not 
all leaders would readily enter into a coalition with the local ACFTU that was closely allied 
with the local government, as explained by Mr Sun:  
 
Although some official unions now outsource auxiliary services to labour NGOs, they don’t 
really trust us. To their eyes, we are not legitimate. Union and party officials are worried that we 
interfere with worker representation, which they think should be their business.  It is not an easy 
relationship. … We’d better ‘go our own way’ (jingshui bufan heshui). 
 
 
Community unions in Japan are highly independent of the state. Benefiting from the liberal 
legal recognition that enabled a small yet resilient labour countermovement, leaders had long 
embraced a distinctive left-wing culture. They were not hesitant to rail against the country’s 
conservative politics and corporate dominance. Through collaboration with various 
stakeholders, community unions occasionally managed to lead high-profile political campaigns, 
such as a well-reported Hibiya Tent for homeless temporary dispatched workers and a more 
recent campaign to raise national minimal wage. It should be noted here that, compared to 
strong civil society’s advocacy power in countries such as the UK, Japan’s civil society was 
rigidly controlled by the state and too weak and fragmented to offer a substantial partnership 
(Pekkanen 2006). Within Tokyo’s metropolitan area, there existed different types of small-scale 
coalition between community unions and civil society groups, designed primarily to provide 
vulnerable workers with services in a variety of areas including workplace safety insurance, 
religion, education and housing. For example, a leading community union formed a service-
  21 
focused local partnership with Catholic Tokyo International Centre and Tokyo Occupational 
and Health Centre.  
Leaders concurred that, in order to make a real impact on policy making, they should form 
broad alliances and seek direct dialogue with Rengo, the most powerful national union 
confederation. Yet, in reality, they not only deeply despised Rengo for colluding with the 
management, but also kept their distance from Rengo-affiliated community unions, as Mr 
Kobayashi commented: 
 
Rengo is not a real union; it is a management’s sweetheart union, representing the interests of 
big companies. They now try to establish their own community unions to bolster the declining 
membership, but they are not really interested in fighting for vulnerable workers. … They don’t 
like us and we don’t like them. The feeling is mutual! 
 
At the national confederation level, Rengo’s stance was bitterly opposed by Zenrokyo and 
Zenroren; the latter were associated with left-wing political parties and derived much of their 
support from public and service sectors. The majority of community unions were affiliated with 
Zenrokyo. While sharing a common antagonistic attitude towards Rengo, Zenrokyo and 
Zenroren had a historically developed frosty relationship due to Zenroren’s association with the 
Communist Party. As a result, independent and Zenrokyo-affiliated community unions tended 
to shun any collaboration with their counterparts affiliated to Zenroren, as described by Mr 
Kawaguchi, a highly influential veteran leader: 
 
The Communist Party’s despotic control in the past has left an indelible mark in people’s 
memories. Many of us still vividly remember the disaster it caused to the labour movement. … 
Their leadership style is tyrannical and we don’t share the same political ideals. … Yes, X is a 
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Zenroren-affiliated community union supported by some unpopular Communist politicians. 
Even though X’s campaign initiative is great, many of us find it hard to join hands. 
 
In addition to the high-level, affiliation-based rift, community unions were plagued by 
internecine strife within the same affiliation or organisation; internal fighting and splitting in 
turn generated new amalgamations. This distinct factionalism — which has its roots in 
‘groupism’, a defining character of Japanese culture6 — was responsible for an increasingly 
patchy, heterogeneous and fragmented union landscape unfolding in Japan. This was further 
exacerbated by declining union membership rates (Figure 5). During occasional joint 
campaigns (such as the annual May-Day March), which were usually organised by politically 
neutral elites or lawyers’ associations, there was a clear seating and communication divide 
between different confederations’ affiliates. Figure 6 illustrates how an unwieldy jumble of 
unions, political parties and civil society groups were temporarily connected together via a 
high-profile campaign led by community unions.  
 
 
Figure 5: Union Density in Japan (1947-2015) 
(Source: Basic Survey on Labour Unions, MHLW 2015) 
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Figure 6: A Joint Anti-Poverty Network and Hakenmura Movement during the Year-
End and New Year of 2008-2009 
(Source: Takasu 2012: 305) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
As vigorous champions of labour rights, CLOs in China and Japan play an important role in 
promoting social justice for workers, especially disadvantaged groups such as rural migrants 
and women. To some extent, they were pioneering a nascent stage of what scholars refer to as 
‘social movement unionism’, which aims to move beyond workplace struggles, broaden the 
social basis of resistance and influence policy (Fine 2006, 2007; Holgate 2015; McBride and 
Greenwood 2009; Tattersall 2010; Heery et al. 2012; Tapia 2013; Engeman 2015). Such a 
positive presence notwithstanding, neither labour NGOs in China nor community unions in 
Japan has been able to drive meaningful social change. Through the lens of leadership, the 
above comparative study highlights a series of challenges arising from both structural and 
agential factors.  
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Figure 7: Leadership challenges facing labour NGOs in China 
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Labour NGOs in China 
Figure 7 summarises how leadership activism in China’s labour NGOs is embedded in and 
shaped by an intricately interwoven political, economic and cultural forces. When engaging 
workers, leaders adopted a strong law-oriented focus on individual dispute resolution. This 
focus was in tune with the state’s enthusiasm for ruling the country by law and for promoting 
a ‘harmonious society’ (he xie she hui) — a reinvention of Confucianism aimed at reconciling 
social tensions and defusing class formation7. Since 2008, the state has enacted a series of pro-
labour laws, with the aim of encouraging aggrieved workers to rely on law as the tool for 
resolving ‘individual’ disputes — as Gallagher et al. (2015) remark, China would rank third in 
Employment Protection Legislation strictness among OECD countries. The crux of the matter, 
however, has always resided in the weak enforcement of laws and regulations. For one thing, 
local governments, empowered by the state’s economic decentralisation, are keen to nurture a 
pro-capital, pro-stability climate8. The pressure to stand out in terms of growth has led to 
rampant corruption. In many cases, local officials use their authority to advance their personal 
--'Harmonious Society’ 
--Laws and regulations (enforcement) 
--State/Party-led industrial relations 
 
 --Institutional legitimacy 
 
--Hierarchy (rural-urban citizenship) 
--Political control 
--Political control, shifting state strategies 
--State/Party-led industrial relations 
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interests; many develop surreptitious relationships with businesses and grant them privilege and 
protection — activities that constitute a key element in China’s lax regulatory environment. For 
another, in marked contrast to the increasing autonomy conferred upon private capital, the 
official ACFTU continues to be a vital component of political centralisation, functioning as 
government agencies or benevolent mediators9. The absence of independent unions — a key 
driver of ‘bottom-up pressures’ (Chung 2015) — and collective bargaining rights leaves 
workers’ daily struggles in a decidedly uneven battlefield. As Friedman (2014) argues, while 
the state makes paternalistic concessions by enacting pro-labour legislations, the local 
government forges a strong alliance with employers, enforces market despotism and suppresses 
workplace conflicts. This central-local government division, coupled with official unions’ 
subservience to the state, is a salient feature of China’s industrial relations. It allows for 
continued legitimacy of the central state amid growing antagonism towards employers and local 
governments. Labour resistance, as a result, is ‘alienated’ (Friedman 2014); despite its rising 
number and intensity, worker insurgency was either brutally suppressed or adroitly channelled 
into the state-controlled legal and bureaucratic apparatus (Lee and Zhang 2013).  
Friedman and Lee (2010) argue that labour NGOs’ legal emphasis — which is also supported 
by many foreign foundations — is complicit in the harmonisation of structural conflicts and in 
the cellularisation of workers, thereby militating against workers’ participation in policy-
making processes at the class level. Significantly, this emphasis has also clouded a critical issue 
in respect of hukou, the rural-urban citizenship divide. Institutionally, hukou poses serious 
barriers to durable labour movements as rural migrants, who are deprived of opportunities to 
settle in the city, ‘float’ between production in the city and reproduction in the countryside. 
Moreover, deriving its symbolic power from Confucian hierarchical moral codes and reinforced 
by the state’s neoliberal development discourses, hukou perpetuates traditional prejudice and 
metes out social injustice to rural populations as second-class citizens10. The cultural 
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discrimination, combined with labour NGOs’ lack of institutional legitimacy, affects adversely 
leaders’ everyday interactions and contributes to the lack of trust and understanding from rural 
migrant workers.  
In terms of their engagement with internal networking, coalition building and policy making, 
labour NGOs were shackled predominantly by political and economic obstacles. The state’s 
top-down control and shifting strategies compelled leaders to prioritise survival, focus on 
depoliticised activities and shy away from fostering any large-scale collective actions that could 
be seen as serious threats to social stability. Operating within a limited political space, a grey 
legal zone and an informal civil society, labour NGOs struggled with not only a tenuous lawful 
status but also limited financial and human resources, which in turn put considerable strain on 
the relationship among themselves. Their sporadic pro-labour coalition with official ACFTU 
unions, which could be best described as ‘ad-hoc’, to use Tattersall’s typology (2018), served 
largely in the interests of the state and local governments. Again, the above-mentioned 
characteristics of China’s industrial relations present a paramount structural barrier to the 
development of meaningful and sustainable pro-labour experiments. 
 
Community unions in Japan 
In Japan, community unions are highly independent of the state and enjoy substantial legal 
freedom. Nonetheless, leaders’ collective bargaining strategy was directed towards individuals 
or a small group of individuals. The main reason for this lies in Japan’s industrial relations 
marked by employer-dominated ‘enterprise unionism’ (kigyo kumiai) or decentralised 
bargaining at the enterprise level11. Compared to the state/Party-led political unionism in China, 
the Japanese enterprise unionism is characterised by the dominance of private employers and a 
cooperative management-union relationship where the firm’s performance is considered as the 
most important determinant by both parties12. The Japanese state, in contradistinction to the 
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 Figure 8: Leadership challenges facing community unions in Japan 
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Chinese state’s ‘visible hand’, is notoriously ‘elusive’, with party officials, ministry bureaucrats 
and employer associations composing a cohesive power triumvirate where no one seems to rule 
the roost13. Underneath this ‘truncated pyramid’ (Wolferen 1989), there has long existed a cosy 
relationship between business and government, often operating along informal lines, where 
large employers have preferential accesses to government ministries and exert a powerful 
influence on state policy14. For workers, it is the employer, rather than the state, that provides 
much of the social safety net coverage — for example, Japan spent only 0.17% of GDP on 
unemployment benefits, the second lowest of all OECD countries in 2015. In addition to this 
so-called ‘welfare corporatism’ (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990), employers have historically 
been adept at building institutions and shepherding workers and their struggles into the confines 
of a single firm by dint of not only coercive measures but also ‘creative’ use of culture. As 
Goodman (1998) explains, Japan’s post-war ‘firm-as-family’ employment system was created 
by appropriating the apparent discursive power of Confucianism-informed traditional values, 
in order to keep workers loyal to the firm, mask labour-management conflicts and boost profits. 
Under the system, the fate of workers would be closely tied to the single firm, and pressure to 
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socialise into the ‘corporate community’ reinforced this (Whittaker 1998). This employer-
dominated enterprise unionism has remained relatively stable in contemporary Japan, despite 
rapid expansion of non-regular temps and ‘non-regular regulars’ (Gordon 2017) on the labour 
market periphery. Consequently, community unions met immense difficulties in mobilising 
workers across different firms and engaging in broad working-class representation. 
The industrial relations structure alone, however, cannot fully account for the whole 
spectrum of leadership challenges facing community unions (Figure 8). Although benefiting 
from the liberal political and legal environment, leaders struggled to attract and maintain rank-
and-file members who tended to see community unions as ‘Refuge Temples’ aimed at providing 
temporary individual solutions. They were unable to strike a positive or responsive chord with 
the general public who showed an apathetic, if not negative, attitude towards labour activism. 
Such a marginalised presence has much to do with the fatal defeat of key union movements in 
the post-war labour struggles, historically inherited ideological conflicts between union factions 
and state-controlled civil society, which, together with the employer-dominated enterprise 
unionism, generate Japan’s ‘liberal yet weak institutional frameworks’ (Royle and Urano 2012: 
619). To be sure, they present considerable impediments to building robust and durable ‘labour 
associational power’ across organisational and union-affiliation boundaries (Kojima 2017). In 
particular, the distinct factionalism at multiple levels is a major contributing factor to Japan’s 
increasingly patchy and fragmented labour movement landscape. The corollary is that even 
high-profile joint political campaigns — such as Hakenmura led by community unions (Figure 
6) — have had little or no impact on the policy-making process.  
Perhaps more strikingly, older-generation male leaders were enmeshed in informal power 
struggles and protracted interpersonal disputes. They were prone to the traditional practice of 
‘King-of-the-Mountain’ (oyama no taisho), referring to  a (male) leader of a small group who 
is content with protecting, and creating an obligation of gratitude from, weak members of 
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society. This practice is also related to the enduring union factionalism rooted in the Japanese 
culture of ‘groupism’ where inter-group competition is a salient feature15. For aggrieved 
workers and ordinary members, it smacks of an assumed male superiority and condescending 
charity, which run counter to community unions’ proclaimed equality and social justice ideals. 
Arguably, this highly gendered, seniority-based and group-oriented leadership discourages a 
broad cross-section of workers from participating in labour movements, especially women and 
young people who comprise the majority of most disadvantaged workers in Japan. Together, 
those structural and agential factors predispose community unions to prioritise individualised 
bargaining, act in isolation and ensconce themselves at the periphery of labour politics as 
‘Refuge Temples’. They pose serious challenges to the establishment of novel collective (or 
distributed) leadership configurations that can, as illustrated by Butler and Tregaskis (2018)’s 
study, produce successful change management. 
 
Social action as a total social phenomenon 
This comparative research reveals the complex ways in which leaders’ perceptions and 
practices are embedded in and shaped by an intricately interwoven web of political, economic 
and cultural forces, as shown earlier in Figure 1. Social action is indeed a total social 
phenomenon whose many spatial and temporal manifestations necessitate a contextualised and 
holistic approach. By bringing the anthropological insights to bear upon critical leadership 
studies, this research helps to unpack popular romanticised assumptions, which posit a 
representation of universal, natural or transcendental truth, attribute undue influence and 
responsibility to leaders, and leave little room for the possibility of leadership manifesting in 
paradoxical, conflictual or contradictory terms (Collinson et al. 2018). 
The first main finding is that national industrial relations, especially the institutional 
dynamics between the state, capital and labour, has a direct impact on leadership activism in 
CLOs. That the Chinese state/Party-led political unionism contrasts sharply with the Japanese 
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employer-dominated enterprise unionism and union factionalism leads to distinctly different 
sets of leadership challenges. Clearly, the state-capital-labour relationship, along with other 
relevant institutional arrangements concerning laws and regulations, civil society and welfare 
provision, plays a prominent role in affecting leaders’ ability to develop collective-action 
capacities and galvanise social change.  
Secondly and more importantly, the comparative research sheds light on the critical role of 
culture and its implications for agency. In both China and Japan, the political-economic 
institutional environment that circumscribes leadership activism is imbued with cultural values; 
the latter are often implicit in, and instrumentally used to legitimise, the former. The 
interconnectedness between culture and social institutions provides both opportunities and 
challenges for social change agents. On the one hand, culture, as a system of malleable symbols, 
enables discursive multivocality and is therefore amenable to social (re)construction (Turner 
1967; Cohen 1969, 1974). On the other hand, such agential freedom in practice is not immune 
from institutional and structural constraints, especially when it comes to deep-seated cultural 
norms and beliefs that pervade almost every aspect of social life. The resulting tension perhaps 
explains why leaders in China and Japan’s CLOs appeared to be undertaking both 
internalisation and dis-internalisation of their inherited ‘native categories’ (Buckley and 
Chapman 1997; Moore 2015). While presenting themselves as a progressive force for social 
justice and equality in public discourse, leaders were complicit in, or acquiesce to, the 
maintenance of core cultural values, notably hukou- or gender-based Confucian hierarchy, in 
everyday practice. The apparent discrepancy between what leaders say they (should) do and 
actually do might be attributed to leadership integrity; in a possible yet rare scenario, some 
leaders were mainly interested in using their position of power to amass personal prestige and 
enhance superior status. The vast majority, however, did want to make a positive difference 
through their hard and often unrewarded work. To a great degree, the contradiction between 
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leaders’ official discourse and everyday practice attests to the depth and extent of cultural 
pervasiveness and embeddedness in both political-economic processes and personal lives. 
Thus, successful social action entails leaders’ capacity to engage in critical self-reflexivity 
and to recalibrate the role of culture in contesting the status quo. Another thought-provoking 
issue emerging from the research is concerned with the effectiveness of promoting such 
globally popular concepts as equality, human rights and social justice. Deriving their discursive 
power form Christianity-informed individualism and egalitarianism, these western concepts 
require careful reinterpretation and reconstruction, not least in countries that are influenced by 
diametrically opposite cultural values. As strong advocates of ‘rule-by-law’ (fazhi) and ‘human 
rights defenders’ (weiquan), leaders in China’s NGOs vociferously emphasised labour rights 
violations, but rarely linked these to hukou’s institutional exclusion and cultural discrimination. 
For over half a century, hukou has institutionally legitimised two classes of citizenship whereby 
rural citizens are denied equal access to social welfare and subjected to abuse and exploitation 
by urban employers, as documented by numerous writers (Lee 1998, 2007; Pun and Liu 2010a, 
2010b; Peng 2011; Zhang 2014; Swider 2015; Fu et al. 2018). Similarly, in envisioning a better 
society, leaders in Japan’s community unions had largely failed to directly challenge persistent 
cultural assumptions regarding the male breadwinner-female dependent family model. 
Crucially, this patriarchal gender order remains the single most important cause of social 
inequality in Japanese society, which underlies the country’s entrenched labour market dualism, 
state regulatory and welfare frameworks, corporate management strategies and mainstream 
unions’ conservatism (Gottfried 2009, 2014; Yun 2010; Roberts 2011; Osawa et al. 2013; 
Macnaughtan 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
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Focusing on CLOs’ leaders in China and Japan, this paper has attempted to offer an alternative 
way of tackling populist and academic infatuation with romanticised leadership that derives its 
genesis (and persistence) from western thought. By contextualising leadership activism as a 
total social phenomenon and adopting thick descriptions, the empirical findings have uncovered 
the ‘non-romantic’ facets of leadership, especially those arising from the tension between 
culture and social institutions. To use Grint (2010)’s metaphor, it is the room, the ‘sacred’ 
surrounding space, not the elephant, that makes leadership more susceptible to critical analysis. 
Like all studies, there are inherent limitations in the research design. For example, not 
sufficient attention was given to workers, i.e. followers, although efforts were consciously made 
to incorporate their views into the analysis. Future research could critically engage with 
leadership by delving into everyday intricacies of workers’ life and the way in which leadership 
is perceived and affected by workers. Followership research may prove particularly valuable 
for leadership studies in CLOs, traditional unions and other advocacy organisations, since 
leaders’ ability to influence depends much on perceived legitimacy from followers they seek to 
represent. Furthermore, much could be gained from cross-national comparative and empirically 
grounded research, which has the potential to provoke new ways of thinking. As this study 
hopefully suggests, the ‘non-western’ holism lends itself easily to critical investigation by 
forcing us to ‘gain an awareness of what otherwise goes without saying, the familiar and 
implicit basis of our common discourse’ (Dumont 1985: 94).  
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Notes 
1. In this paper, ‘west’ and ‘western’ is written with a small ‘w’ to underline that the author does not 
subscribe to the view that The West or Western Culture is a monolithic entity. 
2. While taking holism as the point of departure, both functionalism and structural functionalism 
emphasise the harmony and maintenance of the social whole in which individuals are largely 
subjugated to the power of social structures.  
3. For a disciplinary comparison between anthropology and sociology, see Goodman (2006). 
4. The is the membership number of Community Union National Network in 2020. 
(https://sites.google.com/site/cunnet/home). 
5. Figure 4 shows a massive increase in formally processed labour disputes from 19,098 in 1994 to 
715,163 in 2014, with a precipitous jump from 2008 when the new Labour Contract Law came into 
effect. The rising labour unrest in China was fuelled in part by younger and better-educated migrant 
workers who were less tolerant of injustice and more eager to engage in all manner of resistance 
(Chan and Selden 2014). 
6. Groupism has its traditional cultural roots in han, a nationwide quasi-espionage network of five-
family neighbourhood (gonin gumi) created in Tokugawa feudal Japan (Sugimoto 2010: 290-97).  
7. ‘Harmony’ is a central concept in Confucian philosophy, emphasising co-prospering, 
complementarity and hierarchical solidarity in social relationships. Classical uses of the term also 
denote loyal opposition and constructive disagreement, but later interpretations focus on stability and 
order, which carry paternalistic and benevolent overtones and can be used as a convenient political 
tool for supressing dissent. The term ‘harmonious society’ has been introduced by the Hu 
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government since the early 2000s as a major policy orientation against a backdrop of growing social 
disparities and conflicts intensified by decades of unrelenting marketisation.  
8. Although the state’s decentralisation policy has created space for private domestic and foreign firms 
— which now contribute to the majority of economic output and employment — the latter’s 
meaningful autonomy can only materialise if ‘remaining deeply integrated with local governments’ 
(Friedman and Kuruvilla 2015:182). Many large private firms depend to varying degrees on 
government patronage and intervention, creating a system of ‘crony capitalism’ (Pei 2016). 
9. The state exerts a powerful influence over the direction of economy directly through a gradually 
shrinking but highly concentrated state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Compared to its counterparts in 
other major economies, SOEs command a far bigger share of national resources and are often used 
as ‘instruments of macroeconomic policy and industry regulation’ (Kroeber 2016: 89).  
10. The state’s neoliberal development discourses have dramatically transformed the image of peasants 
from Mao-era ‘liberation heroes’ to ‘modernisation losers’, which often invoke ‘suzhi’ (quality) to 
problematise the peasant body as having low quality, lacking civility and hindering development (Fu 
et al. 2018: 818). 
11. Japanese enterprise unions maintain a high level of control over financial and personnel matters; for 
example, they retain 80-85% of union dues (around 1-1.5% of employees’ wages) and give only 15-
20% to high-level union organisations and national centres (Jeong and Aguilera 2008: 124). In 
addition, a small minority of large enterprises command around 65% of the total number of union 
membership. 
12. Such a shared understanding is facilitated by a customary practice where union officials are not only 
employees of the enterprise concerned, but often become managers at later stages of career after a 
temporary assignment in the union. This personnel cross-posting is also characteristic of China’s 
Party-led unionism where unions’ bureaucratic hierarchy is cut off by Party officials at all levels of 
personnel administration (Chan and Chiu 2015). 
13. Equally striking is the Japanese state’s friendly or soft authoritarianism; as Sugimoto (2010: 290-97) 
explicates, instead of wielding power from above and imposing coercive sanctions, the Japanese 
controlling mechanism is characterised by ‘groupism’, a kind of lateral control, which is effective in 
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eliciting maximum compliance in a moralistic fashion by dint of intro-group surveillance and inter-
group competition, as evidenced by the well-known Quality Control (Kaizen) system in the Japanese 
workplace.  
14. While the business-ministry cooperation in Japan varies over time with shifts in the balance of power 
and the mode of interaction, neither side tries to ride roughshod over the other. The close alliance 
lies at the heart of Japan’s economic management, rendering the role of politicians largely ‘ratifying’, 
rather than ‘shaping’, in the policy-making process (Dore 1986:23). 
15. See Note 6, 13. 
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